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I.

To What Portions of the Award Does Interest in a Section 19(g)
Proceeding Attach?
J. When Can a Section 19(g) Action be Filed?
K. Closing Thoughts on Section 19(g)
The end of a workers’ compensation claim is signaled by a final
decision that is no longer appealed or by the approval of a settlement
contract. In cases resolved short of settlement, two of the lingering
questions are whether interest is applicable to the award, once final, and if
so, in what amount? Although interest is provided for by section 19(n) of
the Workers’ Compensation Act, the wording of the statute is not crystal
clear. Moreover, the case law interpreting the interest provisions of section
19(n) is confusing and has taken many different avenues over the years.
Practitioners are left wondering to what portion of the award section 19(n)
interest applies. How can I avoid interest? When does the higher nine
percent judgment interest rate of section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil
Procedure apply?
Regardless of how a case is resolved, another significant issue arises if
the party against whom the award was rendered—the employer—fails to
pay the award, either at all or in a timely manner. In such cases, what are
the procedures to reduce the Commission’s decision to judgment and how
are such awards enforced? What attorneys’ fees and costs are recoverable
and at what rate is interest computed on the amounts owed? Some of these
questions are answered by section 19(g) of the Workers’ Compensation
Act, while others remain unclear.
This article touches upon two often neglected topics in Illinois
workers’ compensation law; the calculation of interest on a workers’
compensation award and the litigation of a section 19(g) proceeding to
enter judgment on a Commission decision. Both issues are significant to
practitioners on both sides of the proverbial litigation fence. Unfortunately,
both issues are also often neglected by case law and even when covered in
decisions, are murky even to the experienced workers’ compensation
litigator.
I.

AWARDS OF INTEREST ON DECISIONS

An award of interest after a decision is governed by section 19(n) of
the Act. According to that section:
After June 30, 1984, decisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation
Commission reviewing an award of an arbitrator of the Commission shall
draw interest at a rate equal to the yield on indebtedness issued by the United
States Government with a 26-week maturity next previously auctioned on the
day on which the decision is filed. Said rate of interest shall be set forth in the
Arbitrator’s Decision. Interest shall be drawn from the date of the arbitrator’s
award on all accrued compensation due the employee through the day prior to
the date of payments. However, when an employee appeals an award of an
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Arbitrator or the Commission, and the appeal results in no change or a
decrease in the award, interest shall not further accrue from the date of such
appeal.
The employer or his insurance carrier may tender the payments due under the
award to stop the further accrual of interest on such award notwithstanding the
prosecution by either party of review, certiorari, appeal to the Supreme Court
or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the award.1

Under recent decisional authority, section 19(n) interest applies from the
date the arbitration decision is filed through the date prior to the day of
payment on those unpaid amounts under the award.2 In most cases, this
calculation is relatively simple and examples will be provided later in the
text.3
Yet questions remain concerning the appropriate interest rate and its
commencement date once the Commission’s decision is reduced to
judgment under section 19(g). According to one recent appellate court
majority decision, section 2-1303’s higher nine percent interest not only
applies to a Commission’s decision once it has been reduced to judgment,
but the higher rate applies retroactively to all unpaid amounts of the award
back to the date of the initial award. In other words, the nine percent
judgment interest applies to dates prior to the entry of judgment and the
employer is subjected to nine percent interest from the date of arbitration or
the date of the Commission’s award.
Moreover, there is a current dispute among the petitioner and
respondent’s workers’ compensation bar in Illinois as to whether section 21303 judgment interest applies once the circuit court rules on a section 19(f)
judicial review. Petitioner’s counsel across the state have recently been
demanding section 2-1303’s nine percent judgment interest following the
resolution of a judicial review to the circuit court or an appeal to the
appellate court. This article examines that issue and rejects the reasoning of
the petitioner’s bar, pointing out that judgment interest can only commence
once a judgment has been entered via section 19(g). The Commission’s
decision is not a final judgment.
A. Historical Perspective
The imposition of interest on an award has taken many variations over
the years, and has frequently involved the interplay between the Act and the

1.
2.
3.

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(n) (2015).
See Radosevich v. Indus. Comm’n, 367 Ill. App. 3d 769, 778, 856 N.E.2d 1, 9 (4th Dist. 2006);
see also Sunrise Assisted Living v. Banach, 2015 IL App (2d) 140037, ¶ 32.
See infra pp. 14–16 and accompanying text and notes.
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various Illinois interest statutes. The following section provides a
background on the imposition of interest on a workers’ compensation award
and shows how we have reached the point, often of confusion, that we are
at with today’s statutory provisions.
Prior to 1975, the provisions of the section 3 of the Interest Act
applied to judgments entered on Industrial Commission awards.4
According to section 3, “[j]udgments recovered before any court or
magistrate shall draw interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
the same until satisfied.”5 However, section 3 judgment interest did not
apply to proceedings involving reviews of a Commission decision. Thus,
prior to the enactment of section 19(n), interest could only be awarded in
proceedings under section 19(g) of the Act filed in the circuit court to
reduce the Commission’s decision to judgment.6 Therefore, no interest
could be awarded unless the claimant pursed a section 19(g) proceeding.7
As a result of this discrepancy, in 1975 the Illinois General Assembly
enacted section 19(n) of the Act to specifically govern interest in workers’
compensation cases that were beyond the reach of section 3.8 Section
19(n), as then in effect, read: “[a]ll decisions of the Industrial Commission
confirming or increasing an award entered by an arbitrator of the
Commission shall bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
the arbitrator’s award on all compensation accrued.”9
As is apparent from the face of the amended Act, section 19(n) as
initially enacted retained the six percent judgment interest rate used by the
judgment interest statute, but simply applied it to the Commission’s award
from the date of arbitration through payment. Section 19(n) further
permitted the employer or his insurance carrier to “tender the payments due
under the award to stop the further accrual of interest on such award
notwithstanding the prosecution by either party of review, certiorari, appeal
to the Supreme Court or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the
award.”10
In Bray v. Industrial Comm’n,11 the appellate court commented on the
interplay between the new section 19(n) and the former section 3, which by
then had been superceded by section 2-1303, stating:
It seems clear that section 19(n) was enacted to provide authority for the
assessment of interest in those cases which were otherwise excluded from
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 74, §. 3.
Id. See also Bray v. Indus. Comm’n, 161 Ill. App. 3d 87, 93, 513 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1st Dist.
1987).
Aper v. National Union Electric Corp., 165 Ill. App. 3d 482, 486, 519 N.E.2d 117, 120 (4th Dist.
1988).
See Proctor Comty. Hosp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 50 Ill. 2d 7, 9, 276 N.E.2d 342, 343 (1971)
(discussing an appeal of a circuit court ruling under section 19(g) to reduce the Commission’s
decision to judgment and to initiate enforcement).
Bray, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 93, 513 N.E.2d at 1049.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, § 138.19(n).
Id.
Bray, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 513 N.E.2d at 1045.
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obtaining an award of interest under the interest statute, but does not
otherwise affect the applicability of that statute to awards under the Workers'
Compensation Act.12

This comment from Bray seems to have been lost on some of the
decisions rendered by the appellate court and Supreme Court during the
1980s and early 1990s, as they struggled to determine the applicability of
each statutory provision.
In 1984, the General Assembly amended section 19(n), leading to the
current statutory language in place today.13 As amended, section 19(n)
reads, in pertinent part:
After June 30, 1984, decisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation
Commission reviewing an award of an arbitrator of the Commission shall
draw interest at a rate equal to the yield on indebtedness issued by the United
States Government with a 26-week maturity next previously auctioned on the
day on which the decision is filed.14

The amendment also provided: “[h]owever, when an employee appeals an
award of an Arbitrator or the Commission, and the appeal results in no
change or a decrease in the award, interest shall not further accrue from the
date of such appeal.”15
Two changes are significant. First, the 1984 amendment changed the
previously fixed six percent interest rate to a variable rate based on the
federal yield on indebtedness.16 In part, this was due to the exceeding high
rates of interest that were prevalent in the early 1980s17 and, at least
according to one source, was due to “the obvious inequalities of the
insurance companies paying merely 6 percent interest on compensation
awards.”18
This aspect of the 1984 amendment was interpreted in Hughes v.
Industrial Commission,19 where the appellate court commented on the
reasoning underlying the amendment, and noted that it believed section
19(n), as amended, was intended to reduce the employer’s cost when not
paying an award. In Hughes, the appellate court observed: “[o]ur review of
the legislative history . . . [indicates that] the amendments to section 19(n)
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

Id.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, § 138.19(n).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(n) (2015).
Id.
Id.
R. WAYNE HARVEY, The “Thankless Task” of Computing Interest on Workers’ Comp Awards, 80
ILL. B.J. 510, 512, n. 15 (1992). The author noted that the average U.S. bond yields of the day
ranged from 15 percent in 1981 and 1982, to 12 and 13 percent in 1983 and 1984 respectively.
Id. at 512.
Hughes v. Indus. Comm’n, 196 Ill. App. 3d 143, 147, 553 N.E.2d 113, 150 (4th Dist. 1990).
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were intended merely to decrease the interest rate applicable to those sums
. . . [and] to save the employer community an estimated $40 million per
year.”20
This seems to contradict some of the remarks made during the
legislative discussions of the amendment, notably that by Senator George E.
Sangmeister, who stated that “the interest rate will be . . . at six month Tbill rates from the time the decisions is filed.”21 At that time, the section
19(n) interest rate would have been thirteen percent.22
As a second change, the 1984 amendment stopped the accrual of
interest on an award where: (1) the claimant appeals the arbitration or
Commission decision; and (2) the appeal results in no change or a decrease
in benefits.23 Thus, if the employee appealed an award of fifty percent
permanent partial disability as to a leg, and the decision was affirmed or
reduced on appeal, the employer would owe no interest from the time of the
appeal forward, but rather only from the date of the arbitrator’s decision to
the filing of the appeal. This litigation stands in contrast to the 1975
version of section 19(n), which terminated the accrual of interest only when
the Commission reduced, but not when it affirmed, the arbitrator’s award.
Moreover, the pre-1984 version did not make any distinction between an
appeal initiated by the claimant or the employer.24
Although no proposals for modifying section 19(n) are currently in
Springfield, it is worth noting that the courts have routinely held that the
version of the statute controlling any given case depends on the version in
effect on the date of the award.25 Thus, it was possible for a 1981 accident,
if the arbitrator’s award was not entered until after June 1984, to have
interest determined under the 1984 amendments.
B. Questions Emanating from the Current Statute
Due to the often confusing decisions rendered over the past twentyfive years, a number of questions remain as to how section 19(n) works and
when interest is awardable—and at what rate—on a Commission’s
decision. In the paragraphs below, we attempt to provide some answers, and
at a minimum, identify for the reader controversies that still remain some
thirty years after the passage of the current section 19(n).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Harvey, supra note 17, at 512, n. 18 (quoting Minutes from Senate Floor Session, June 30, 1984).
As pointed out later in this article, the current August 2015 interest rates, based on the 26-month
T-bills, is roughly 0.21 %.
Harvey, supra note 17, at 512.
See, e.g., Kuhl v. Indus. Comm’n, 147 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524, 498 N.E.2d 240, 243 (3d Dist. 1986).
Id. at 519, 526–27; Fregeau v. General Foods Corp., 224 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766, 585 N.E.2d 627,
629 (3d Dist. 1992).
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1. How is the interest rate set?
The current version of section 19(n) retreated from the higher six
percent interest rate of its predecessor and adopted a floating rate based on
the indebtedness yield of United States Treasury Bills “with a 26-week
maturity next previously auctioned on the day on which the decision is
filed.”26 These rates are now set forth on the Internet and are much easier
to locate than in prior years.27 Under the current statutory language, an
arbitrator’s decision filed on August 27, 2015, would use the Treasury rate
for August 26, 2015, of 0.20 percent.28
The rate is almost always stated within the arbitrator’s decision and is
worded as follows: “[i]f the Commission reviews this award, interest of XX
percent shall accrue from the date listed above to the day before the date of
payment; however, if an employee’s appeal results in either no change or a
decrease in this award, interest shall not accrue.”29 If the arbitrator’s
decision does not contain this rate, a practitioner may call the Commission
and ask for the rate or may consult the chart listed on the Internet. Under
no circumstances, however, is the arbitrator or Commission’s failure to
include a statement as to section 19(n) interest fatal to the claimant’s ability
to recover section interest.30
It is also worth noting that interest under section 19(n) is self-executing and
therefore, no motion for interest is necessary under the Act. 31 That being said,
the cases appear to suggest that the Commission is without authority to
enforce an award of interest. 32 In Saldana v. American Mutual Corp.,33 the
Appellate Court, First District, held that the Commission lacked the authority
to enter judgment for the payment of interest, and thus, the claimant was not
required to go before the Commission to exhaust all administrative remedies
prior to seeking interest under section 19(g). 34

In Hughes v. Industrial Comm’n, the Appellate Court, Fourth District,
reached the opposite conclusion, rejecting Saldana and finding that the

26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(n) (2015).
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DAILY TREASURY BILL RATES DATA, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interestrates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=billrates.
Id. (see rates for 2015).
This is typical language found in an arbitration and Commission decision.
Fregeau, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 766, 585 N.E.2d at 629. (“[T]he Commission’s failure to
affirmatively provide for interest in its decision is … not material.”).
Saldana v. Am. Mutual Corp., 97 Ill. App. 3d 334, 339, 422 N.E.2d 860 863 (1st Dist. 1981)
(interpreting the 1977 version of section 19(n)).
See id.
Id.
Id.
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Commission did have such authority.35 Relying on the prior Illinois
Supreme Court decision in Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial
Comm’n,36 which said that interest accrued under section 19(n) “should
properly be computed by the Industrial Commission,”37 the Hughes court
found that the Commission does have jurisdiction to determine interest due
under section 19(n). However, in Keystone, the Court was construing a
petition brought under section 8(f) to modify a prior permanent total
disability award and not a motion to enforce interest. The Commission in
Keystone had awarded section 19(n) interest as part of its overall penalty
against the employer. Whether Hughes’ interpretation is truly correct is
unknown. However, re-reading Saldana’s reasoning shows that it is in fact
consistent with the decisions holding that a Commission’s decision is not a
judgment and, therefore, not enforceable absent a section 19(g)
proceeding.38 If a Commission decision must be reduced to a judgment per
section 19(g) before it can be enforced, then Saldana’s remarks that the
Commission does not have the power to enter judgment or enforce
collection make perfect sense.39
2. When is interest owed?
Interest is owed on the unpaid amounts of the award through the day
prior to the date of payment.40 Specifically, section 19(n) provides:
“[i]nterest shall be drawn from the date of the arbitrator’s award on all
accrued compensation due the employee through the day prior to the date of
payments.”41
However, when an employee appeals an arbitrator or Commission
award, and the appeal results in no change or a decrease in the award,
“interest shall not further accrue from the date of such appeal.”42
In Hillyer v. Owens Illinois Glass Co., the Appellate Court, Third
District, held that the employers’ obligation to pay interest ceased where the
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.

196 Ill. App. 3d 143, 145, 553 N.E.2d 113, 114 (4th Dist. 1990).
85 Ill. 2d 178, 421 N.E.2d 918 (1981) (interpreting the 1977 version of section 19(n)).
Id. at 188, 421 N.E.2d at 922.
See, e.g., Blacke v. Indus. Comm’n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 26, 28, 644 N.E.2d 23, 24 (3d Dist. 1994).
See Saldana, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 422 N.E.2d at 863.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(n) (2015); Radosevich v. Indus. Comm’n, 367 Ill. App. 3d 769,
778, 856 N.E.2d 1, 8 (4th Dist. 2006). Here, after reviewing several of the prior appellate court
decisions interpreting section 19(n), the appellate court stated, “[c]ases such as Ballard and Folks
are cited for the proposition that a claimant is not entitled to section 19(n) interest on benefits that
accrued after the arbitrator’s award. Radosevich, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 778, 856 N.E.2d at 8.
However, upon further review of these cases and the clear language of section 19(n), specifically
that ‘[i]nterest shall be drawn from the date of the arbitrator’s award,’ we decline to follow
Ballard, Folks and cases with similar holdings.” Id. Although not specifically stated in the
Radosevich opinion, it appears the court, when stating “cases with similar holdings,” may have
been referring to the decisions in Fregeau, Ponthieux v. Fernandes, 278 Ill. App. 3d 104, 662
N.E.2d 169 (4th Dist. 1996), and Pierce v. Tee-Pak, Inc., 196 Ill. App. 3d 544, 553 N.E.2d 1104,
(4th Dist. 1990), all of which made similar rulings bifurcating the period to which interest applies.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(n) (2015).
Id.
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employers filed an appeal challenging a Commission decision, but the
claimants filed a cross appeal seeking an increase in permanency benefits. 43
There, in consolidated cases, the appellate court affirmed the Commission’s
decisions, including the amount of permanency, resulting in no change in
the award. The employers in both cases paid the award, but no interest.
Both claimants filed section 19(g) actions seeking interest, as well as costs
and attorneys’ fees. The circuit court declined to award interest, finding
that the claimants had filed an appeal under section 19(n), even though it
was a cross appeal. The appellate court affirmed, noting that both parties
had appealed the Commission’s decision, which brought the case within the
language of section 19(n).44
3. On what amounts of an award is interest owed?
The question on what amounts is interest applicable was only recently
settled with the December 2005 appellate court decision of Vulcan
Materials Co. v. Industrial Comm’n.45 Prior to Vulcan Materials, interest
was not available on medical benefits because these were not considered
“compensation” under the Act, and interest applied only to awards of
benefits such as total temporary disability and permanency disability
benefits.46 Vulcan Materials clarified the law, holding that medical benefits
are indeed compensation and accordingly interest does attached to the
award of medical benefits.47 Thus today, an arbitrator or Commission
decision awarding TTD benefits, medical benefits, and permanency draws
interest on all aspects of the award from the date of the decision forward.
To illustrate, suppose the arbitrator’s decision issues an award as
follows:

43.
44.

45.

46.

47.

183 Ill. App. 3d 864, 866, 539 N.E.2d 854, 855 (3d Dist. 1989).
Id. at 867, 539 N.E.2d at 855. Of interest, the appellate court also denied any interest under
section 2-1303, finding that the claimants had failed to raise it in the circuit court, and thus waived
the issue. Id. at 867, 539 N.E.2d 856. Moreover, the appellate court upheld the circuit court’s
denial of attorneys’ fees and costs, noting that the employers had paid the outstanding award, and
that under section 19(g), had paid the compensation due. Id.
Vulcan Materials Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1147, 1151, 842 N.E.2d 204, 207 (1st
Dist. 2005). The Vulcan Materials court relied heavily upon McMahan v. Indus. Commission,
183 Ill. 2d 499, 702 N.E.2d 545 (1998), which held that medical benefits are “compensation”
under the Act, and Legris v. Indus. Commission, 323 Ill. App. 3d 789, 754 N.E.2d 402 (4th Dist.
2001), which held that medical benefits were compensation for the purposes of determining
compliance with the statute of limitations under section 6(d) of the Act. Vulcan Materials Co.,
362 Ill. App. 3d at 1150-51, 842 N.E.2d at 207.
Folks v. Hurlburt’s Wholesale Siding & Roofing, Inc. 93 Ill. App. 3d 19, 22, 416 N.E.2d 745,
748–49 (4th Dist. 1981). In Folks, the appellate court held that the furnishing of medical services
was not “compensation” within the meaning of section 8(a) and thus not compensation under
section 19(n). Id.
Vulcan Materials, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1152, 842 N.E.2d at 207.
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Total temporary disability benefits

$22,578.00

Medical benefits

$76,112.00

Permanency benefits

$97,650.00

Total award =
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$196,340.00

If the decision was filed on January 17, 2013, the section 19(n)
interest rate would be 0.11 percent. Annual interest on this award would
then be $215.97, and daily interest would be $0.59.
Even so, an employer’s credits must be taken into account. Thus, if a
decision involves a credit to the employer for overpayment of TTD benefits
or medical or an advance of permanency benefits, those amounts must be
subtracted from the total amount of the award before interest can be
calculated.48 Using the above example as an illustration, if the employer
had paid a portion of the TTD benefits and a portion of the medical
benefits, the amount of the award subject to interest would be less. If the
employer had paid $15,000 in TTD benefits and $55,250 in medical
benefits, the adjusted unpaid balance would equal $126,090, and section
19(n) interest calculated on that amount would be $138.70 annually, or
$0.38 per day.
Another aspect of the interest puzzle occurs where the Commission,
on review, increases a portion of the award over and above that rendered by
the arbitrator. In such a case, how is interest calculated on the modified
award? Does interest apply on the entire award, as increased by the
Commission, back to the date of the initial arbitration award, or does
interest on the added amount commence only upon the Commission’s
ruling modifying and increasing the overall award? The same question
applies when a lower tribunal decision—that of the arbitrator or the
Commission—is modified and increased by the circuit court on judicial
review.
This question was answered in Kuhl v. Industrial Comm’n,49 where
the arbitrator awarded total temporary disability (TTD) benefits, which
were reduced by the Commission on review. On judicial review to the
circuit court, the TTD benefits were reinstated and further increased. On
the employer’s appeal, the circuit court’s order was affirmed. The
employee then sought to enforce the judgment and the payment of interest
for the entire cause. The circuit court awarded interest under section 19(n).
On appeal, the appellate court held that there were two distinct periods of
interest to which section 19(n) applied. The first period covered the
original arbitration award of TTD benefits from its award through payment.
48.
49.

See Fregeau v. General Foods Corp., 224 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766, 585 N.E.2d 627, 628 (3d Dist.
1992), for discussion that interest does not accrue on amounts paid, only those remaining unpaid.
Kuhl v. Indus. Comm’n, 147 Ill. App. 3d 519, 498 N.E.2d 240 (3d Dist. 1986).
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The second period covered the circuit court’s increase in benefits, and
interest on that amount commenced upon the circuit court’s order, and not
the date of the original arbitration award. Kuhl makes sense in that the
employer, prior to the circuit court’s order, did not owe the additional
amounts and could not, even had it wanted to, tender any amounts to toll
that interest.
A different result occurs, however, where the initial arbitration award
is categorized as a permanent partial disability (PPD) award and that award
is modified by the Commission into a wage differential award. In
Ponthieux v. Fernandes, the appellate court responded to this scenario by
ordering that interest was due on the wage differential award from the date
of the original arbitration award, despite the fact that the original award was
rendered as a PPD benefit rather than a wage differential.50
Another situation of interest occurs where the arbitrator and
Commission deny the claim, thus awarding no benefits, and the rulings are
reversed by the circuit court on judicial review, and a new Commission
decision is issued finding the claim compensable and awarding benefits.
This exact scenario was presented in Poe v. Industrial Comm’n, where the
appellate court held that interest would accrue only from the date of the
Commission’s second decision.51 In support of its position, the appellate
court stated: “[u]pon remand the exact amount of the employer’s liability, if
any, could not have been known until the Commission’s subsequent
decision had been rendered.”52
The court then added:
Until the Commission’s decision upon remand was rendered, the extent of the
employer’s liability and obligation was not settled. In short, while the cause
was pending upon remand, a definite amount had not been set so that the
employer had a reasonable opportunity to avoid accruing interest. Therefore,
the circuit court properly denied the claimant an award of interest for the
period of time from March 3, 1986, the date of the Commission's original
award, to June 17, 1988, the date of the Commission's decision upon
remand.53

Thus, under Poe, if the employer prevails until the matter goes on
appeal, section 19(n) interest will not accrue until the Commission, on

50.

53.
52.
53.

See 278 Ill. App. 3d 104, 114–15, 662 N.E.2d 169, 176 (4th Dist. 1996). Of interest, the court, in
part per agreement of the parties, used the bifurcated interest formula from Ballard (which applies
section 19(n) interest to those portions of the award that were accrued at the time of arbitration
and applies section 2-1303 judgment interest to those portions of the award that accrued after the
date of arbitration). Moreover, Ponthieux was an appeal following a section 19(g) proceeding.
Poe v. Indus. Comm’n, 230 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10, 595 N.E.2d 593, 599 (2d Dist. 1992).
Id. at 8–9, 595 N.E.2d at 598.
Id. at 8–9, 595 N.E.2d at 598.
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remand, makes a determination as to the award. Interest will not begin on
the date of the original arbitration.
4. An Example of How to Calculate Section 19(n) Interest.
Most workers’ compensation cases take years to resolve. This means
there is often considerable time between the date of the arbitrator’s award
and the conclusion of the review/appeal process and ultimately payment of
the award. Even assuming that the employer immediately pays an award
following the conclusion of an unsuccessful appeal, interest calculations
can be challenging.
To illustrate how to calculate the payment of interest over a multi-year
case, assume the following example:
The claimant suffers a significant back injury on April 6, 2009. A claim is
filed and the case is arbitrated in May 2011, resulting in an arbitration
decision filed on July 11, 2011. The award breaks down as follows:

TTD benefits

=

$119,117.13 ($636.99 x 187 weeks)

Medical benefits

=

$165,010.07

PPD benefits

=

$214,875.00 ($573 x 375 weeks (75% person))

=

$499,002.20

Total award

The applicable interest rate per section 19(n) is set at 0.07 percent
based on the yield for July 9, 2011. The case is appealed without success
by the employer to the Commission, circuit court, and ultimately the
appellate court, which affirms the Commission’s award on August 10,
2014. The employer pays the award on August 14.
Because no payments were made and there were no credits applicable,
interest is calculated on the entire amount due and owing of $499,002.02,
which yields $349.30 per year, or $0.96 per day. The total interest owed is
$1,078.62, representing three years and 32 days the time between the
arbitration award on July 11, 2011 and payment on August 12, 2014.
A more difficult calculation ensues if the award is for a wage
differential or for a permanent total disability benefit, which are paid
weekly. In most cases, there is some period of time between the claimant
reaching maximum medical improvement (MMI) and the award of
permanency benefits, so there will usually be a small lump sum paid
representing the permanency owed from MMI to the arbitration date, and
then the weekly amounts commence thereafter. The interest calculation
remains the same for the amounts paid per lump sum, but interest payable
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on the weekly benefits, to be completely accurate, must be calculated
individually. For example, if the wage differential is $275 per week and the
employer owed the claimant for 60 weeks ($16,500) representing the time
post arbitration for any review, the first weekly payment owed would have
interest calculated at 60 weeks; the second weekly payment owed (one
week later) would have interest calculated at 59 weeks, and so forth.
Theoretically, applying the interest rate to the total amount owed of
$16,500 for the entire 60 weeks produces a windfall for the employee.
Realistically, however, with the interest rates currently so low, most
employers simply use this methodology and pay interest on the $16,500
based on the entire 60 weeks rather than spend the attorneys’ fees
calculating the interest based on individual weeks. Just to illustrate, using
the 0.07 percent rate from the example above would yield interest of $11.55
on the $16,500. In contrast, calculating interest based on a stream of
payments would be much less, but would likewise be cost-prohibitive to
calculate, once we factor in attorneys’ fees to make the calculation.
5. Is section 2-1303’s interest applicable to a circuit court judicial review
decision?
As mentioned above, a recent development in Illinois workers’
compensation practice has been the effort by a sizeable number of
petitioner’s attorneys to demand section 2-1303’s statutory nine percent
judgment interest on a Commission award once confirmed by the circuit
court on appeal. According to these attorneys, once the circuit court
confirms the lower tribunal’s decision awarding benefits, the Code of Civil
Procedure applies and section 19(n) interest ceases to be applicable.
Despite these assertions, the law is clear that a Commission’s decision
is not a judgment.54 A circuit court on judicial review exercises special
jurisdiction and may only exercise those powers conferred by the statute.55
In a judicial review, that statute is section 19(f), which empowers the circuit
court to confirm or set aside the Commission’s decision.56 According to the
Illinois Supreme Court, “[i]f it confirms the decision it has no authority to
enter a money judgment for the amount of the award nor to order execution
to issue.”57 Moreover, the Supreme Court said, “[i]n a proceeding to review

54.
55.
56.
57.

Blacke v. Indus. Comm’n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 26, 28, 644 N.E.2d 23, 24 (3d Dist. 1994); see Sunrise
Assisted Living v. Banach, 2015 IL App (2d) 140037, ¶ 32.
Grollemond v. Indus. Comm’n, 5 Ill. 2d 541, 550, 126 N.E.2d 211, 217 (1955).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(f) (2015).
Interlake Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 60 Ill. 2d 255, 262, 326 N.E.2d 744, 748 (1975).
Interlake Steel involved a judicial review of a Commission decision wherein the claimant sought
to impose interest on the employer as part of the circuit court’s entry of judgment confirming the
Commission’s decision.
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an award of the Industrial Commission the circuit court has no authority to
tax interest in entering its judgment confirming the award.”58
That section 2-1303 judgment interest is unavailable until the
commencement of a section 19(g) proceeding makes sense, when one
considers that the Commission’s decision, without more, is not a
judgment.59 By its own terms, section 2-1303 is limited in application to
judgments, which on its face disqualifies section 2-1303 until a judgment is
entered on the Commission award through an appropriate section 19(g)
proceeding.
An additional compelling ground also exists for this
conclusion applying section 19(n) to all interest issues on an award prior to
the entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) is wholly consistent with
limiting section 2-1303 to those instances where unpaid awards remain
following entry of the section 19(g) judgment order. In reading each statute
in this manner, both are given effect and neither statute is rendered
meaningless. Indeed, interpreting section 2-1303 as applying in any setting
beyond that of a section 19(g) judgment would infringe upon the scope of
section 19(n), and render it meaningless. As case law has held, “[s]tatutes
which relate to the same thing or to the same subject or object are in pari
materia, and should be construed together as though they were one statute,
even though enacted at different times.”60
On a similar note, applying section 19(n) to all aspects of a workers’
compensation case through the resolution of appeal, and short of entry of an
order of judgment from a section 19(g) proceeding, is consistent with the
purpose behind enacting section 19(n). Clearly the passage of section 19(n)
was intended to create a specific interest rate applicable to workers’
compensation decisions. The general rules of statutory construction clearly
dictate that a specific statute governs over a more general statute.61 Here, in
some respects both section 19(n) and section 2-1303 are specific statutes—
both have a targeted period to which they apply. Section 19(n) applies
specifically to awards rendered by the arbitrator or Commission, while
section 2-1303 applies specifically to judgments. In an overall sense, both
are general statutes and give way to the other when they conflict.
Thus, section 19(n) interest applies through and until the award is
paid, and until the claimant moves in a separate circuit court proceeding
under section 19(g) to enter judgment and to enforce the judgment. 62
58.
59.
60.

61.

62.

Id.
Blacke, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 28, 644 N.E.2d at 24; Sunrise Assisted Living, 2015 IL App (2d)
140037, ¶ 32.
Spring Hill Cemetery v. Ryan, 20 Ill. 2d 608, 614, 170 N.E.2d 619, 622 (1960). While a specific
statutory provision controls over a general provision on the same topic, when two statutes relate to
the same subject matter they should be construed harmoniously where possible. In re Marriage of
Pick, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1065, 458 N.E.2d 33, 36 (2d Dist. 1983).
People ex rel. Madigan v. Burge, 2014 IL 115635, ¶ 31 (“The general/specific canon is perhaps
most frequently applied to statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by
a specific prohibition or permission. To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision is
construed as an exception to the general one.”) (quoting Rad/LAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012)).
Sunrise Assisted Living, 2015 IL App (2d) 140037, ¶ 32.
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Section 2-1303 judgment interest is not applicable to an arbitrator or
Commission award until that award has been reduced to judgment via a
section 19(g) proceeding.
6. What Does “Accrued” Mean and does section 2-1303 interest apply to
those amounts that had not yet accrued at the time of arbitration?
A line of appellate court decisions beginning with Folks v. Hurlbert’s
Wholesale Siding & Roofing, Inc.,63 and culminating in Ballard v.
Industrial Comm’n,64 created a two-tiered system for determining interest
on a workers’ compensation award based on whether the award had accrued
at the time of arbitration or afterwards.65 In Folks, the arbitrator awarded
total temporary disability (TTD) benefits, medical benefits, and a
permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits was based on a weekly rate.66
The employer tendered payment of the TTD benefits with interest, medical
benefits without interest, and PPD benefits without interest. The claimant
then filed a section 19(g) action to collect interest.
The appellate court held that section 19(n) interest applied only to
those non-medical portions of the award that had “accrued” on the date of
the arbitration award.67 According to the Folks court, section 19(n)’s use of
the past tense term “accrued” is significant.68 “When read in conjunction
with the clause which immediately precedes it, clearly interest is due only
on those sums which have ‘accrued’ on the date of the award.”69 As a
result, the appellate court found that interest could not be awarded on
weekly PPD payments coming due after the arbitrator’s award.70
Building on the Folks ruling, the appellate court in Ballard went one
step further and not only applied section 19(n) interest to those portions of
the “accrued” award remaining unpaid, but then awarded section 2-1303
judgment interest to those amounts accruing after the date of the arbitration
award.71 According to the court, section 19(n) applied only to the date of
the award as to accrued benefits. Those benefits which accrued after the
date of the arbitrator’s award were not subject to section 19(n). The
procedural history in Ballard was straightforward. The arbitrator had found
the claim compensable and awarded TTD benefits and PPD benefits of 71/2 percent of a person for a low back injury. The Commission reversed
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

93 Ill. App. 3d 19, 416 N.E.2d 745 (4th Dist. 1981).
172 Ill. App. 3d 41, 526 N.E.2d 675 (3d Dist. 1988).
Ballard, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 44, 526 N.E.2d at 677.
Folks, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 21, 416 N.E.2d at 747.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ballard, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 44-45, 526 N.E.2d at 677–78 (emphasis added).
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based on a lack of causal connection, and alternatively, reduced
permanency to three percent of a person. The circuit court reversed and
remanded the case back to the Commission, which found the claimant
permanently and totally disabled. The employer paid the award but refused
to pay interest on the award following remand.
The Ballard court acknowledged that section 19(n)’s six percent
interest applied to the original arbitration award, but noted that section
19(n), based on Folk, did not apply to the subsequent Commission decision
award because it had not accrued at the time of the arbitration award.72
Without any true explanation of its actions, the appellate court concluded:
Despite the fact section 19(n) does not apply, claimant is still entitled to
interest on the amount of unpaid benefits accruing after November 21, 1980,
calculated from May 30, 1985, through June 10, 1987. Since section 19(n)
does not apply, interest is properly taxed at 9% under section 2-1303 of the
Code.73

The court continued:
Under the rationale of those cases, section 19(n) of the Act and section 2-1303
of the Code must be considered in pari materia. We agree that the purpose of
assessing interest is to encourage prompt payment of awards and there should
be as much incentive for a defendant to make the periodic payments which
accrue after the arbitrator's award as there is to pay those sums which accrue
in the award.74

According to the court, “[n]othing in section 19(n) suggests a change
in the applicability of section 2-1303 to judgments on Industrial
Commission awards as opposed to awards which are covered in section
19(n).”75 Ballard also found its conclusion was “in complete harmony”
with the Kuhl decision, where the appellate court held that interest on an
award which was increased by the Commission was properly calculated at
the rate of six percent.76
The Ballard court seems to have overlooked the plain language of
section 2-1303, which limits its application to judgments.77
The
Commission’s decision, regardless of the stage of the direct appeal, is not a
judgment and it cannot be executed absent a circuit court order entered
under section 19(g). Moreover, Ballard’s reliance on Kuhl seems
misplaced given that the court in Kuhl appears to have applied the pre-1984
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 45, 526 N.E.2d at 678 (citing Proctor Comty. Hosp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 50 Ill. 2d 7, 276
N.E.2d 342 (1971) and Bray v. Indus. Comm’n, 161 Ill. App. 3d 87, 513 N.E.2d 1045 (1st Dist.
1987)).
Id. (citing Folks, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 21, 416 N.E.2d at 747).
Id. (citing Bray, 161 Ill. App. 3d 87, 513 N.E.2d 1045 and Aper v. Nat’l Union Elec. Corp., 165
Ill. App. 3d 482, 519 N.E.2d 117 (4th Dist. 1988)).
Id.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1303 (2015).
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amendment 6 percent section 19(n) rate. It does not appear that Kuhl
applied the statutory judgment interest rate. Even so, Kuhl was examining
the interest obligations under a section 19(g) proceeding, which if judgment
was entered on the Commission’s award would justify application of the
section 2-1303 judgment interest provision.
Ballard, as well as Folks and similar decisions advocating the twoperiod interest approach, have been seriously called into question by
Radosevich and Sunrise Assisted Living, whereby the appellate court
applied section 19(n) interest to all aspects of the underlying workers’
compensation case and limited section 2-1303’s application to judgments
entered on Commission decisions following a section 19(g) proceeding. 78
Radosevich and Sunrise Assisted Living are much more logical in their
approach and consistent with the General Assembly’s intention of creating
an interest rate applicable to workers’ compensation proceedings short of
the entry of judgment.
C. What Constitutes a Tender So as to Preclude The Accrual Of Interest?
The last portion of section 19(n) states that “[t]he employer or his
insurance carrier may tender the payments due under the award to stop the
further accrual of interest on such award notwithstanding the prosecution by
either party of review, certiorari, appeal to the Supreme Court or other steps
to reverse, vacate or modify the award.”79 Generally speaking, a tender
must include “everything to which the creditor is entitled” and “a tender of
any less sum is nugatory and ineffective as a tender.”80 A tender must also
include interest and costs due as accrued. If an employee is entitled to
interest, and the employer fails to tender it, the circuit court may conclude
the tender is not effective to stop the accrual of interest and, a circuit court
may potentially enter judgment under section 19(g).
Procuring the award, with today’s very low interest rates, makes little
sense for most employers, especially if the tender is made directly to the
claimant.81 And while an escrow account may be utilized, there is still little
advantage to the employer. Of special note, even if an employer or its
carrier does tender payment to stop the accrual of interest, there is nothing
which would exempt the employer from its independent obligation to

78.
79.
80.
81.

Radosevich, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 778, 856 N.E.2d at 8; Sunrise Assisted Living, 2015 IL App (2d)
140037, ¶¶ 31–32.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(n) (2015).
Smith v. Gen Corp., 11 Ill. App. 3d 106, 109, 296 N.E.2d 25, 28 (3d Dist. 1973).
A tender to the claimant directly may well simply disappear and if the Commission’s decision is
reversed, may then be beyond recovery.
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procure an appeal bond supported by a surety, as required in order to
prosecute an appeal under section 19(f).82
As explained earlier in this article, a tender of at least some portion of
the award, or payment of some benefits owed, means that interest will only
accrue on the amounts yet unpaid.83 This is true whether the question is the
application of section 19(n) interest or judgment interest under section 21303. However, as noted below, an employer may still be subject to a
section 19(g) proceeding if there is a refusal by the employer to pay the
remaining award or if the refusal to pay interest is found to lack good faith.
D. Conclusions on Interest
Hopefully this segment of the article provides better insight into how
interest is calculated on a workers’ compensation award and puts to rest
some of the arguments advanced that section 2-1303 judgment interest
applies at any time prior to the entry of judgment on the Commission’s
decision as part of a section 19(g) proceeding. Certainly there is room for
clarification of section 19(n). Indeed, a legislative effort to modify section
19(n) would be welcomed to eliminate any remaining confusion as to the
application of interest to a workers’ compensation award.
The authors hereby suggest the following amendment to section 19(n)
to alleviate many of the problems highlighted herein:
Interest shall be awarded on all compensation, including medical benefits,
awarded by the Arbitrator or Commission, and payable at the rate of X percent
per annum, from the date of the award through the day prior to the date of
payments. Said rate of interest shall be set forth in the Arbitrator’s Decision.
However, when an employee appeals an award of an Arbitrator or the
Commission and the appeal results in no change or a decrease in the award,
interest shall not further accrue from the date of such appeal. 84
The employer or his insurance carrier may tender the payments due under the
award to stop the further accrual of interest on such award notwithstanding the
82.

83.
84.

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(f) (2015). Some practitioners continue to post the amount of the
award (or bond amount) with the circuit court in escrow in lieu of obtaining an appeal bond
backed by a surety, as required by section 19(f). There is no authority supporting the sufficiency
of such a course of action, and anyone who so proceeds does so at his or her own risk. If the
judicial review is not properly secured by a valid bond, the circuit court will lack subject matter
jurisdiction.
Poe, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 11, 595 N.E.2d at 599; Ponthieux, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 112, 662 N.E.2d at
174.
The authors take no stance on the third sentence of the proposed statutory revision, but note that
with recent decisions such as Jacobo v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, most employers
will tender payment of the amounts due and owing while the appeal proceeds on the employee’s
issues. 2011 IL App. (3d) 100807WC, 959 N.E.2d 772 (2011). In Jacobo, the appellate court
found that the employer had no legitimate reason to delay payment of the undisputed awards for
TTD, PTD, and medical expenses, while it pursued an appeal of other unrelated issues. Id. at 25,
959 N.E.2d at 783. It then found that if any part of an employee’s undisputed benefits were not
promptly paid, the employer was subject to penalties and attorney fees under 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 305/19(l). Id. at 26, 959 N.E.2d at 783.
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prosecution by either party of review, judicial review, appeal to the Supreme
Court or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the award.

Over the years, the appellate court and Supreme Court have handed
down many confusing, and at times conflicting, decisions interpreting
section 19(n) and its interplay with section 2-1303. In part, that is due to
the confusion between actions for interest as a part of a workers’
compensation claim, and actions under section 19(g), which are clearly
subject to section 2-1303 judgment interest.85
Another problem with the plethora of appellate court decisions is that
some were rendered by the various appellate court districts, while others
were rendered by the Appellate Court, Workers’ Compensation
Commission Division. To better clarify the law and to promote consistency
in the interpretation of section 19(g) as well as interest, the authors strongly
recommend that all appeals involving the interpretation of section 19(g) be
channeled to the Workers’ Compensation Division, which has expertise in
workers’ compensation law and is better suited to addressing such issues.86
II.

SECTION 19(G) ACTIONS TO ENFORCE

A. What Type of Relief Does Section 19(g) Afford?
Section 19(g) of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act provides
parties to a workers’ compensation claim with a mechanism for enforcing
the final award by reducing it to judgment in circuit court by simply
providing the court with a certified copy of the final award.87 A final award
may be achieved at many procedural stages. An arbitrator’s decision
becomes final once thirty days has lapsed after receipt of the decision
without either party reviewing the award to the Commission.
A
Commission decision becomes the final award when it is not reviewed to
the circuit court within twenty days of receipt of the decision.88 The circuit
and appellate courts can also issue final decisions during review
proceedings, the finality of those decisions are determined on a case-bycase basis and depend on whether the case is remanded to the Commission
for further proceedings, in which case the Commission’s decision will

85.
86.

87.
88.

See supra Part II, for the authors’ discussion of the application of section 2-1303 judgment
interest in the context of a section 19(g).
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 22(i) created the Appellate Court, Workers’ Compensation
Commission Division, in 1984, and empowered it to hear all cases arising under the Act. ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 22(j). The purpose of the rule was to promote consistency and uniform application of the
law across the state.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(g) (2015).
§ 305/19(f).
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constitute the final award.89 An approved settlement contract also has the
legal effect of a Commission decision and is the equivalent of an award for
purposes of section 19(g).90
Section 19(g) does not allow parties to collaterally attack the accuracy
of the Commission decision; that remedy is afforded through direct appeal
in section 19(f).91 Rather, it simply provides for speedy entry of judgment
on the award. The timeframe for review under section 19(f) of the Act is
tight—twenty days from the date on which the party receives the
Commission’s decision.92 The interplay between these sections became
muddied a bit in Gurnitz v. Lasits-Rohline Service, Inc., when the plaintiff
sought to correct an “irreconcilable inconsistency” in the Commission’s
decision using section 19(g).93 In the underlying action, the Commission
unequivocally found the claimant permanently totally disabled under
section 8(f), but ordered benefits be paid at the permanent partial disability
rate which was inconsistent with its permanent total disability finding.94
The case was appealed all the way to the appellate court on its merits.
About one year after the court affirmed the Commission’s order of
permanent total disability at the incorrect permanent partial disability rate,
the claimant sought to reduce the “Commission’s will” to a judgment and in
doing so, sought to correct the permanent disability rate.95
The employer argued that the claimant’s cause of action was improper
under section 19(g) because claimant effectively sought to challenge the
Commission’s decision, which is grounded explicitly in section 19(f).96 In
support of its position, the employer cited a number of cases which held
that the plaintiff’s cause of action under section 19(g) was actually an
improperly filed section 19(f) action challenging the Commission’s
award.97 Each decision cited by the employer involved an employer who
sought to introduce additional substantive evidence to challenge the
Commission’s decision on its merits, while none of the decisions involved a
true “irreconcilable inconsistency” on the face of the decision, like that
involved in Gurnitz.98
Correcting a true, facial irreconcilable inconsistency under Burns or
Gurnitz is proper under section 19(g) and does not constitute a modification

89
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
98.
99.
98.

Stockton v. Indus. Comm’n, 69 Ill. 2d 120, 124–125, 370 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1977).
Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 73 Ill. 2d 259, 265, 383 N.E.2d 207, 209–10 (1978).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(f) (2015); see, e.g., Franz v. McHenry Cnty. College, 222 Ill. App.
3d 1002, 1006, 584 N.E.2d 536, 539 (2d Dist. 1991) (explaining the court may not review the
commission’s decision and that 19(f) is the proper channel for review).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(f) (2015).
368 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1134, 859 N.E.2d 1156, 1161 (3d Dist. 2007).
Id. at 1136, 589 N.E.2d at 1162.
Id. at 1135–36, 589 N.E.2d at 1160–61.
Id. at 1134, 589 N.E.2d at 1162.
Id.
Id.; see Burns v. Indus. Comm’n, 95 Ill. 2d 272, 277–78, 447 N.E.2d 802, 802–5 (1983) for a
holding an irreconcilable inconsistency within the Commission’s award examined under section
19(g) requires the court to interpret what the Commission had actually awarded within the four
corners of the decision.
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of the Commission’s award because the correction is intended to align the
Commission’s intentions with its words.99 The absolute and limited
purpose of section 19(g)—the Commission’s will be done, literally—limits
the court’s inquiry solely to whether the requirements of the section have
been met. The court is not permitted under section 19(g) to review the
Commission’s decision or otherwise construe the Act, unless the
responding employer establishes fraud or lack of jurisdiction.100
The court cannot modify the Commission’s decision under section
19(g) even when the decision appears too large on its face.101 Similarly,
section 19(g) actions cannot be initiated to modify an award when the
limitations period for a Section 19(h) proceeding has run even if the end
result appears unfair. Section 19(h) of the Act allows an employer to
challenge a section 8(d)1 wage differential award within 60 months of the
date of the award (30 months within the date of the award if the work
accident occurred before February 1, 2006) where the claimant’s disability
has diminished or ended.102 In Dallas, the claimant filed a section 19(g)
action to enforce his wage differential award after his former employer
stopped his section 8(d)1 benefits.103 The employer responded that wage
differential benefits were no longer due and owing because as soon as the
limitations period for a section 19(h) challenge ran, the claimant went back
to pre-accident work which is exactly what the Commission found him
incapable of doing, earning more than pre-accident wages. The court,
hands tied, found that the employer had refused to pay the award and
entered judgment under section 19(g). It declined to award discretionary
attorneys’ fees for the claimant’s appeal.

99.

100.
101.
102.

103.

The next logical inquiry for any workers’ compensation practitioner or scholar in this scenario is:
Should not the plaintiff have noticed and sought clarification of this inconsistency during the
course of the underlying appeal? The Gurnitz court noted that the plaintiff filed the action to
address the incorrect, lesser rate within one year of receiving the incorrect amount which was
reasonable. Gurnitz, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1136–37, 589 N.E.2d at 1162–63.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(g) (2015); Franz v. McHenry County College, 222 Ill. App. 3d
1002, 1006, 584 N.E.2d 536, 539 (2d Dist. 1991).
Aurora East School Dist. v. Dover, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1055, 846 N.E.2d 623, 629–30 (2d
Dist. 2006).
Dallas v. Ameren CIPS, 402 Ill. App. 3d 307, 313, 929 N.E.2d 1267, 1272 (4th Dist. 2010). The
employee can challenge the award as well within this time frame if his disability has recurred or
increased. 19(h) confers ongoing jurisdiction on the Commission in these instances where
installment awards, like those under section 8(d)(1), are awarded. Contrast ongoing jurisdiction
for permanent total disability awards under section 8(f), also installment awards, which lasts the
duration of the payments, i.e., the life of the claimant. The authors advocate for ongoing
jurisdiction for life of section 8(d)(1) awards which, under the current Act, are payable until age
67 or five years after entry of the award, whichever is later.
Id.
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B. Who are the Parties?
Section 19(g) provides remedy for either party to file a petition with
the circuit court to request that a judgment be entered on the final
Commission decision, whether that be an arbitration decision, Commission
decision following a review of an arbitrator’s decision, or an approved
settlement contract. For all intents and purposes, workers’ compensation
claimants file section 19(g) petitions against their employers for allegedly
refusing to pay final awards. The employee brings the action in his own
name against the employer in its name. The circuit court will exercise
subject matter jurisdiction against only those parties involved in the
underlying action at the Commission.
For example, an employee cannot bring the action against the
employer’s insurance carrier unless the insurance carrier was a named party
in the underlying action before the Commission.104 Due process precludes
a workers’ compensation claimant from enforcing an award against the
employer’s insurance carrier without first filing a separate action and
obtaining an award against the carrier.105 The rationale for this is that the
insurance carrier, if not initially sued in the underlying action, does not
have an opportunity to defend the action, investigate the case before the
hearing, obtain an independent medical examination, cross-examine the
claimant or present witnesses on its own behalf. This protective mechanism
exists even though the carrier is identified by the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Commission as having coverage for the claim and,
practically speaking, has likely been involved in the underlying action and
is probably contractually bound to the employer to pay at least part of the
award.
The plain language of section 19(g) precludes an enforcement action
against the State of Illinois as well.106 This seems to be rooted in principles
of sovereign immunity and consistent with the public policy that a
judgment against the State shall not control its actions or subject it to
liability.107 Only where the State has consented to be sued will the State be
sued and in section 19(g), the State has clearly stated its intent to be exempt
from statutory enforcement proceedings, by stating that the relief afforded
by section 19(g) is available to parties, “[e]xcept in the case of a claim
against the State of Illinois.”108 Sovereign immunity will not only bar State
employees’ attempts to enforce awards entered against the State, the courts
have also interpreted the language to also preclude actions against the State
Treasurer as the administrator of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund.109
104. Aber v. Am. Home Assurance, 2011 IL App. (4th) 110194-U, ¶ 1; McAnally v. Butzinger
Builders, 263 Ill. App. 3d 504, 509, 636 N.E.2d 19, 23 (5th Dist. 1994).
105. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/4(g) (2015).
108. § 305/19(g).
107. Dratewska-Zator v. Rutherford, 2013 IL App (1st) 122699, ¶¶ 20–22.
108. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(g) (2015) (emphasis added).
109. Dratewska-Zator, 2013 IL App (1st) 122699, ¶ 22. The Fund is a special statutory fund created
by the Act which is intended to compensate injured workers employed by entities who are
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C. What Must Be Filed?
Section 19(g) provides little guidance on what is expected on either
party when filing a proceeding to reduce the Commission’s decision to
judgment. Nevertheless, a party seeking to do so must file a complaint with
the circuit court in the appropriate venue110 and attach thereto a certified
copy of the Commission’s decision. The latter document can be obtained
from the Commission in Chicago. The complaint should allege the
appropriate dates of the underlying awards, the amounts due under those
awards and amounts remaining outstanding, that payment has been
requested and denied or simply not made, and then set forth any alleged
entitlement to attorneys’ fees, costs, and appropriate interest.
The proceeding, although emanating from section 19(g) of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, will be otherwise governed by the Code of
Civil Procedure. This includes service of process and any rules governing
motion practice. Once filed, and properly responded to by the defendant,
the matter should be set for either an appropriate motion hearing (if one is
filed) or an evidentiary hearing, whereby the plaintiff presents evidence to
establish the various allegations. The circuit court serves as trier of fact and
receives deference on any appeal therefrom. Appeals should be filed with
the Appellate Court, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division,
through the appropriate geographic appellate court.111
D. Is There a Limitations Period?
While the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act does not include a
limitations period within Section 19(g), the courts have sought guidance
and found solution in the Code of Civil Procedure and illustrative case law.
In Blacke, the court established a five year statute of limitations for section
19(g) enforcement actions seeking judgment on an arbitrator’s award.112
Here, the claimant prevailed at arbitration and the award was affirmed by
the Commission in January of 1984. The employer never made payment on
the award, so in 1992 the claimant brought additional action before the
Commission seeking penalties pursuant to Sections 19(k) and 19(l) of the
Act. In March of 1993, the claimant filed a Section 19(g) action seeking
payment of both the underlying award and the subsequent penalties award.

unlawfully uninsured. The Fund is comprised of monetary penalties collected from employers
who violate insurance requirements of the Act.
110. Section 19(g) provides venue for such actions, stating that such claims shall be filed in the circuit
court of the county “in which such accident occurred or either of the parties are residents. . . .”
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(g) (2015).
111. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 22(i).
112. Blacke v. Indus. Comm’n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 26, 27, 644 N.E.2d 23, (3d Dist. 1994).
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The court denied the claimant’s petition finding it untimely pursuant to
Section 13-205 of the Code.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that no statute of limitations was
applicable to his section 19(g) action or, alternatively, that a section 19(g)
action was subject to a ten year statute of limitations. In arguing for no
statute of limitations, the claimant contended that the purpose of statutes of
limitations in general—to prevent false or stale claims when evidence to
refute those claims may be lost or unavailable due to time—would be
served. Because the claimant’s underlying claim had already proceeded on
the merits, a statute of limitations was in applicable to his claim to enforce
the award following the claim on the merits. Furthermore, section 19(g)
does not provide for statute of limitations. However, to the extent the
legislature did not include a statute of limitations within the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act, the court will look to the Code.113
The right to bring a section 19(g) action is statutory by definition
therefore subjecting it to a five year limitations applicable to the “catch-all”
provision set forth in section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure
encompassing “all civil actions not otherwise provided for.”114 The courts
have settled this issue with respect to statutory rights of actions in other
contexts.115 For the claimant in Blacke, this cause of action accrued 20 days
following the Commission’s affirmance of the arbitrator’s January 1984
award. Therefore, his cause of action was tolled under the five year
limitations period set forth in section 13-205 no later than February of
1989. His claim was certainly untimely when filed in March of 1993 and
properly denied.116
Section 19(g) actions to enforce the terms of approved settlement
contracts are subject to the ten-year statute of limitations for written
contracts.117 Section 13-206 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
actions on written contracts shall be commenced within ten years after the
cause of action accrued. In section 19(g) actions that seek to enforce a
settlement contract, the statute begins to run on the date on which the
alleged breach of contract occurred. For example, in Gassner, the
settlement contract left section 8(a) medical treatment benefits open to the
claimant for life for treatment related to the underlying worker’s
compensation claim. Subsequent to the contract approval, the claimant
incurred additional medical treatment expenses which he claimed were
related to his work injury. The employer disagreed and a dispute arose as
to whether the employer would be responsible for payment of those medical
treatment charges because section 8(a) medical benefits were ongoing
113. Blacke, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 28.
114. Id.
115. See Powles v. Cnty. of Alexander, 310 Ill. App. 602, 604, 35 N.E.2d 92, 94 (4th Dist. 1941), for a
holding that a suit to collect unpaid benefits pursuant to a statute to protect the blind was subject
to five year statute of limitations for civil action not otherwise provided for in Section 13-205.
116. Blacke, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 3.
117. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-206 (2015); Gassner v. Raynor Mfg. Co., 409 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1004,
948 N.E.2d 315, 324 (2d Dist. 2011).
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under the terms of the settlement contract. The claimant incurred the
medical treatment expenses on May 1, 2003 which is the date on which his
action accrued and started the clock on the statute of limitations. When he
filed his section 19(g) petition with the trial court on October 31, 2008, the
responding employer argued that a five year statute of limitations barred the
plaintiff’s section 19(g) claim.
The employer argued that a Commission-approved settlement contract
is the equivalent of an arbitration award subject to enforcement under
section 19(g) as an action arising from statute and therefore subject to the
five year statute of limitation articulated in Blacke.118 The Gassner court
rejected that argument finding that the reasoning in Givens supported a ten
year limitations period because the action was premised on a written
contract.119
E. How Can an Employer Attack a Section 19(g) Petition?
Generally, an employer responding to a section 19(g) petition can
utilize a responsive pleading just as it would in any other civil case. The
Code of Civil Procedure provides for disposition of a pleading, and in some
cases an entire cause of action, for various reasons which can be utilized to
attack section 19(g) enforcement actions, particularly sections 2-615 and 2619. Section 2-615 challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint
whereas section 2-619 admits the legal sufficiency but asserts certain
defenses to the pleading.120 When faced with a section 2-615 motion to
dismiss, the court must construe the allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff and determine whether they are sufficient to state a cause of
action.121 Examples of defenses asserted in section 2-619 motions to
dismiss in the section 19(g) context are sovereign immunity (asserted by the
State) failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Another affirmative defense is payment of the award.122
F. What Defenses are Available?
The employer’s most significant affirmative defense to a section 19(g)
action and corresponding award of attorneys’ fees and costs is the employer
made full payment on the entire award. The employer may be able to claim
118. Blacke, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 27; but see also Givens v. Givens, 192 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101, 548 N.E.2d
571, 574 (1st Dist. 1989), for a holding that an action to enforce an approved settlement contract
was an action based on a written contract for which a ten year limitations period was appropriate;
see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-206 (2015).
119. Gassner, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 1004, 948 N.E.2d at 324.
120. Bayview Loan Serv’g, LLC v. Cornejo, 2015 IL App (3d) 140412, ¶ 10.
121. Dratewska-Zator v. Rutherford, 2013 IL App (1st) 122699, at ¶ 14.
122. Voorhees v. Indus. Comm’n, 31 Ill. 2d 330, 332, 201 N.E.2d 382, 388 (1964).
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it had a legitimate basis not to pay the award which may provide a defense.
In determining whether the employer legitimately did not pay the award so
as to avoid entry of a judgment under section 19(g) or, more practically, to
avoid imposition of an uncertain amount of attorneys’ fees and costs, the
circuit court may consider several factors: (1) whether the plaintiff has
made demand for payment of the Commission’s decision; (2) the length of
time that transpired between the date the Commission decision became final
and the date the section 19(g) petition was filed in circuit court; (3) the
negotiations and communications between the parties which took place
during that relevant time period; (4) whether the Commission’s decision
leaves room for a good faith disagreement between the parties as to the
amounts due and owing to the plaintiff by the defendant; and (5) whether
the defendant made a good faith offer of settlement and when that offer was
made.123
G. Can the Employer Claim a Credit Against Past Payments to Avoid
Judgment?
Whether the responding employer can claim credit against past
payments when defending these enforcement actions is a question of fact
for the circuit court that will be weighed in the overall analysis of whether
the employer has fully satisfied its obligations under the final award. If
credits are available, they arguably must be stated within the final award or
they will not be available. In the context of section 8(j), which is a main
means of credit for employers under the Act for payments made pursuant to
its group insurance policies where the employer has paid some portion of
the policy premium on the employee’s behalf, the credit must be clearly
established by the record. This credit is often stipulated by the parties at
arbitration, and must “clear, certain, and definite in its material provisions,
and it is essential to that it be assented to by the parties or those
representing them.”124
In Sanchez, the responding employer could not prove that it was
entitled to section 8(j) credit, which would account for its failure to pay that
portion of the award that subjected it to section 19(g) enforcement
proceedings.125 The court held that the parties never assented to the
arbitrator’s comment: “I think it has already been stipulated that
Respondent will get credit for all the amounts paid under [s]ection 8(j).126
Further, the employer exhausted its review proceedings and never

123. McGee v. Ractian Const. Co., 231 Ill. App. 3d 929, 935, 596 N.E.2d 1261 (4th Dist. 1992).
124. Sanchez v. Pactiv, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 132570-U, ¶ 10 (citing In re Marriage of Galen, 157
Ill. App. 3d 341, 344, 510 N.E.2d 597, 599 (2d Dist. 1987)).
127. Id. at ¶ 13.
126. Id. at ¶ 9. It is clear from the decision that section 8(j) credit was identified as an issue on the
parties Request for Hearing form as it often is, which identifies the issues before the arbitrator, but
the amount was left blank and the agreement even if general, was not confirmed on the record.
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challenged the credit issue until raising it as a defense a section 19(g)
enforcement proceeding as a collateral attack which is prohibited.127
Generally, responding employers have a difficult time using credit for
past payments to avoid judgment under section 19(g). This is because the
circuit court’s inquiry under section 19(g) is so limited to whether the
requirements of the section have been met, i.e., whether the underlying
award has been paid in full.128 In Burns, the plaintiff estate had received
payments pursuant to federal statute and under the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act to compensate the estate for decedent’s death related to
coal exposure. The employer argued it had reached an agreement with the
decedent’s estate that the payments made pursuant to the federal claim
under would offset the amounts payable pursuant to the award rendered
final at the Commission. The estate argued it was entitled to additional
benefits from the state claim, notwithstanding any payments made in the
federal claim. In siding with the estate, the court acknowledged the federal
mechanism available to the employer for recoupment of any overpayment
made under the federal black lung claim but ultimately held the employer
simply could not use any overpayment to avoid entry of judgment under
section 19(g) due to the plain language of the statute.129
The Estate of Burns court relied heavily on the decision in Patel,
rendered three years prior. Addressing a similar situation involving credits
for past payments, the Patel court reached an even harsher conclusion for
employers: that past payments made as a result of the underlying workers’
compensation claim could not be used to defeat a section 19(g) claim. The
Patel court held that section 19(g) did not afford employers a mechanism
for claiming credits for past workers’ compensation payments against entry
of judgment on the award. Rather, “the Commission’s decision, on which
any judgment is based, be one providing for the payment of compensation
according to this act,” and a “credit does not equal compensation.”130 The
court went on to conclude, “[a]lthough Home Depot may ultimately obtain
the credit the arbitrator and the Commission granted, it is not entitled to that
credit under section 19(g).”131 These decisions illustrate the narrow mission
of the court when deciding a section 19(g) enforcement action: to determine
whether the award has been paid and if it has not, enter judgment swiftly.

127. Id. at ¶ 14 (citing Bettis v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 242 Ill. App. 3d 689, 691, 610 N.E.2d 1354,
1355 (4th Dist. 1993)).
128. Estate of Burns v. Consolidation Coal Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140503, ¶ 19.
129. Id.
130. Patel v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 103217, ¶3.
131. Id. at ¶ 15.
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H. When Will the Court Assess Attorneys’ Fees and Penalties Against the
Employer?
Attorneys’ fees and penalties are discretionary and can be ordered
when the plaintiff shows that the defending employer refused to pay the
underlying award. The employer’s defense to an award of attorneys’ fees
following a section 19(g) action is its defense to the judgment on the award
—that it did not refuse to pay the award. In Wirth and Poe, disputes over
interest lead to disagreement over the amount due and owing pursuant to
the award.132 The courts held these legitimate disputes did not constitute a
refusal to pay compensation within the meaning of the Act and did not
warrant section 19(g) attorneys’ fees. An additional legitimate dispute
arose where the arbitrator and Commission each failed to designate the rate
of section 19(n) interest.133
A clear-cut rule for calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of a
section 19(g) judgment is not found in the decisions. However, the courts
have suggested that the plaintiff is entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees for
the employer’s “refusal to pay” which suggests that the courts will not only
uphold but also encourage fees representing the entire prosecution of the
claimant’s case, not just the section 19(g) enforcement action. In McAnally,
the employer appealed the arbitrator’s award to the appellate court. When
it refused to pay the award after its appeal was exhausted, citing ambiguous
language in the arbitrator’s decision, the claimant brought a section 19(g)
petition to enforce the award. The employer lost the section 19(g) action
and the appellate court remanded the matter to the circuit court for entry of
judgment and assessment of attorneys’ fees associated with the “employer’s
refusal to pay” and instructed that the fees award “shall include those
incurred in prosecuting the appeal.”134 The court reasoned:
The right to appeal is important and should not be circumscribed, but of equal
importance is an injured worker’s right to be promptly compensated for the
full amount of a final award. Plaintiff was injured seven years ago; if the
workers’ compensation’s goal of prompt payment of legitimate claims is to be
achieved, and if employers are to be encouraged to work toward that goal,
then the legislative imperative of the imposition of costs and attorneys fees on
employees (sic employers) who refuse to pay such awards must be
implemented.135

The McAnally decision seems to mandate that, if awarded at all, costs
and fees for prosecuting the workers’ compensation claim from arbitration
through appeal should be calculated and included.

132. Wirth v. Indus. Comm’n, 63 Ill. 2d 237, 241, 347 N.E.2d 136, 138 (1976); Poe v. Indus. Comm’n,
230 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9, 595 N.E.2d 593, 598 (2d Dist. 1992).
133. McGee v. Ractain Contr. Co., 231 Ill. App. 3d 929, 935, 596 N.E.2d 1261, 1261 (4d Dist. 1992).
134. McAnally v. Butzinger Builders, 263 Ill. App. 3d 504, 509, 636 N.E.2d 19, 22 (5th Dist. 1994).
135. Id. (citing Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 180–81, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356–57 (1978.)
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The approach to attorneys’ fees articulated by the McAnally court
provide an additional penalty against employers for defending underlying
workers’ compensation claims, where the Workers’ Compensation Act
already provides for statutory penalties under sections 16, 19(k) and 19(l)
for unreasonable and vexatious delay in paying benefits associated with the
claim.136 Given the availability of those penalties and attorneys’ fees,
section 19(g) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded for the
prosecution of the section 19(g) enforcement action alone. Any attorneys’
fees and costs above and beyond that represent a modification of the
underlying award, which is expressly prohibited by section 19(g) itself.
I. To What Portions of the Award Does Interest in a Section 19(g)
Proceeding Attach?
As we discussed in the first section of this article concerning interest,
the law is clear that judgment interest applies to a judgment rendered
pursuant to section 19(g). The more perplexing question is whether that
judgment interest, set at nine percent by section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, applies to those unpaid amounts of the award retroactive to the
date of the arbitrator’s award. Unfortunately, the 2006 decision in
Radosevich answers this question in the affirmative, which appears to be
wholly contrary to Illinois respecting the status of the Commission’s
decision and the availability of pre-judgment interest.137
In Radosevich, the appellate court majority held that section 2-1303’s
nine percent judgment applied to an unpaid arbitrator’s award retroactive to
the date of the award.138 The dissenting justice, now federal district court
judge Sue Meyerscough, disagreed, and argued that the Commission’s
decision was not a judgment until entry of the section 19(g) order.139 “The
award itself is not a judgment.”140 Justice Meyerscough then stated,
“because a workers’ compensation award is not a judgment, only after the
workers’ compensation judgment has been entered of record in the circuit
court does section 2-1303 interest apply.”141
Recently one counsel has advocated the retroactive application of
section 2-1303 based on this sentence of section 2-1303: “[w]hen judgment
is entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be computed at
the above rate, from the time when made or rendered to the time of entering
judgment upon the same, and included in the judgment.”142
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 19(k), 19(l) (2015).
Radosevich v. Indus. Comm’n, 367 Ill. App. 3d 769, 778, 856 N.E.2d 1, 9 (4th Dist. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 779–85, 856 N.E.2d at 9–15.
Id. at 779, 856 N.E.2d at 10.
Id. at 780, 856 N.E.2d at 10.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1303 (2015).
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According to counsel, section 2-1303 specifically refers back to the
arbitration award by stating “from the time when made or rendered to the
time of entering judgment upon the same.”143 Yet using this language to
reach back to a point before the entry of judgment runs directly afoul of
section 19(n) of the Act, which is meant to provide for interest on an award
until payment, and prior to the entry of judgment.144 Section 2-1303 clearly
refers to judgment interest and in most civil settings, purports to award
interest for the period between the rendering of the verdict through the
order entering judgment. In most cases these are the same date, but in any
event are rarely more than a few days apart. To allow judgment interest to
reach back what in many cases will be years, is unwarranted and infringes
on section 19(n).
The Radosevich dissent is much more solidly reasoned and should, in
the end, prevail. Unfortunately, due to Illinois jurisprudence concerning the
precedential impact of appellate court decisions, Radosevich applies to
circuit court proceedings in the Fourth District. However, all employers
should raise the arguments that section 2-1303 interest commences only
with the entry of the section 19(g) judgment order, because the more wellreasoned approach recognizes that the Commission’s decision is not a
judgment, and therefore, section 2-1303 judgment interest can only apply
post-judgment. Otherwise the court is awarding pre-judgment interest,
which is obtainable only where provided by statute or by agreement.145 The
Radosevich majority decision fails to recognize this point and amounts what
can only be described as a penalty to the employer. Future appellate court
rulings should limit the application of judgment into to actual judgments.
Thus, following a section 19(g) proceeding, interest should run from the
award through the date of entry of the section 19(g) order, and then section
2-1303 interest should apply from that date forward until the unpaid
balances are satisfied.
J. When Can A Section 19(g) Action Be Filed?
The answer to when a section 19(g) proceeding may be filed seems
clear enough based on the language of the statute—it says “when the
[Commission decision] has become final, when no proceedings for review
are pending, … .”146 On its face, the Act seems clear that the full appellate
process following a Commission decision must be exhausted before a
section 19(g) action may be filed. In Sunrise Assisted Living v. Banach,147
the appellate court rendered its decision on review of the workers’
compensation decision, and the employer paid the award plus section 19(n)
143. Id.
144. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(n) (2015).
145. First Arlington Nat’l Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill. App. 3d 403, 416, 450 N.E.2d 833, 843 (1st Dist.
1983).
146. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(g) (2015).
147. 2015 IL App (2d) 140037.
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interest through the day prior to payment. Prior to the issuance of mandate,
the employee filed a section 19(g) complaint, seeking section 2-1303 nine
percent interest on the award.
To add an interesting twist, the employer opposed the proceeding on
jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the case was still on review, because the
claimant-employee had filed, while the case was pending on appeal, a
section 19(h) proceeding seeking an increase of the award. According to
the Sunrise Assisted Living case, a proceeding under section 19(h) does not
constitute a “proceedings for review” under section 19(g).148 According to
the court, “[a]n order entered by the Commission under Section 19(h) is one
for future modification based on a material change in the employee’s
disability, rather than a review of the original finding of disability.”149
K. Closing Thoughts on Section 19(g)
Although not nearly as murky an area as is interest, there is
nevertheless a need for clarification and perhaps even legislative
intervention, concerning actions to enter and enforcement judgment
respecting a workers’ compensation decision. The most significant aspects
needing modification relate to the employer’s credit, the applicable rate of
interest for amounts due pre-judgment, and the scope of attorneys’ fees
awardable. Section 19(g) should be modified to permit the employer to
offset any credit for overpayment or for payment of section 8(j) benefits.
The notion that there exists any real remedy against the employee, if
payments are made and collection is sought, is simply unrealistic.
Moreover, section 19(g) should be amended to clarify that section 19(n)
interest applies prior to the entry of judgment and that section 2-1303
judgment interest applies thereafter.
Judgment interest should not
commence from the date of the award forward. Finally, attorneys’ fees and
costs should only be awarded for the enforcement and collection efforts,
and not for any aspect of prosecuting the underlying claim.

148. Id. at ¶ 17.
149. Id. at ¶ 18; see also Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 73 Ill. 2d 259, 262, 383 N.E.2d 208 (3d Dist.
1978).

